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 1 Introduction and Motivation 
 
In this paper we propose an allocation model for regulatory capital among risk-bearing business 
units, which has two principal components.  The first is that capital is allocated in a way that the 
managers of business units can consider as ‘fair’, and we provide a means to calculate what the ‘fair’ 
allocation should be.  The second is to introduce the concept of a service, whose purpose is to mitigate 
risk for the business units, and thereby reduce the capital allocation to those business units.  Allocation 
is the final step required after calculating the capital charge pertaining to operational risk under the 
latest regulatory papers (BCBS196 2011).  It is implied that only business units engender risks and only 
their managers can manage them. We argue that this is not so, and therefore model the role of a service 
in the allocation process.   
We may assume that services are charged to the business functions (real or implied) so that they 
generate an income and consequently become business functions themselves. In the context of risk 
mitigation, the service is a Risk Department. To a certain extent, the income of this Risk Department is 
equal to the theoretical amount it enables the risk-bearing business units to save.  The business unit 
generating the largest loss amount, which can be regarded as the one that bears the most risk, would 
require more capital to cover their risks. Unfortunately this strategy is neither risk management sensitive 
or fair considering the investment of the financial institutions in a risk management unit, i.e. it does not 
reward the business unit who is trying to manage its risk in the best way possible. 
In this paper we apply the Shapley allocation method to allocate capital to a large number of 
business units. The Shapley method can be regarded as, in a certain sense, "fair", but the concept of 
fairness must be embedded in a prevailing culture, where the concepts involved are unlikely to be well 
understood by business unit managers.  Shapley’s achievement was to show that there is a single optimal 
(i.e. ‘fairest) allocation solution, for which he received the 2012 Nobel Prize for Economics.  Typically 
we would deal with 8 to 20 business units, and in some cases many more.  We therefore have to develop 
an allocation method that can cope with the combinatorial problems associated with a large number of 
business units in the Shapley process.  The Risk Department provides a service, the result of which is 
to reduce capital payable by the risk-bearing business units, and plays a formal part in the allocation  
The organisation of this paper is as follows.  First we discuss the elements which are important in 
the analysis that follows: diversification and a business model that incorporates a service.  The Shapley 
method is introduced and problems in applying it are discussed.  The role of the Risk Department service 
in the allocation process is then discussed. Two theoretical models are proposed, and are lastly applied 
to operational risk loss data. 
  
2 Diversification and Allocation in Operational Risk 
 
In this section we introduce the relevant elements of this analysis: diversification, allocation and 
the role of a service. In operational risk, business functions are usually termed 'Business Units' (BUs). 
Examples are Retail Banking, Commercial Banking, Card Services etc.  Each BU would normally 
subdivide its activities between Basel risk classes, such as Internal Fraud, Damage to Physical Assets 
etc., as defined in the Basel document (BCBS196 2011).  A combination of one or more business units 
with one or more risk classes is termed a Unit of Measure (UoM). 
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 Note that the capital calculations are not the core topic of this paper. We assume that they have been 
calculated beforehand. The capital calculations presented below are illustration purposes only. 
 
2.1  Capital Charge and Diversification in Operational Risk 
The concept of diversification in operational risk differs from a more traditional usage of the 
term in investment portfolio management.  The distinction is discussed by Leippold and Vanin 
(Leippold and  Vanin 2003).  In the portfolio management context, negative asset correlation (i.e. a 
negative correlation coefficient) results in reduced risk, where risk must be measured by some suitable 
metric. The portfolio risk should be less than the sum of the risks of the assets in it. A discussion may 
be found in, for example, (Wagner and Lau 1971).  In the context of operational risk, diversification 
amounts to less dependence (i.e. a correlation coefficient nearer to zero but not necessarily negative) 
between losses of operational risk UoMs.  The end result is the same though. When operational risk is 
measured in terms of a calculated capital value, if the losses for all UoMs are aggregated, the capital 
value of the aggregation is expected to be less than the sum of capital values of all the UoMs.  In some 
cases the operational risk diversification can appear to be huge due to an averaging effect of combining 
losses. A fuller account of the diversification effects on capital value is given by Monti et al (Monti 
2010).  They link diversification to the dependency structure between operational risk UoMs, estimated 
via correlations.  Significantly, the Basel II regulations, (BCBS196 2011), permit a reduction of 
operational risk capital if the existence of diversification effects can be demonstrated. 
 
2.2  The value of a Business Unit and Allocation 
Given a total capital, a number of methods for allocating it to the BUs are available.  The 
simplest is Pro Rata allocation, in which the total capital is allocated in proportion to some metric of 
the BUs. We call this property the ‘value’ of the BU: and it should reflect the degree of risk associated 
with the BU. Some example of how it could be measured are: 
 Calculate the mean or maximum loss incurred by the BU  
 Calculate value-at-risk (VaR) or expected shortfall (ES) of simulated losses or the BUf 
 Informed scoring by domain experts 
As an alternative to Pro Rata allocation, we will concentrate on the Shapley allocation method, 
which incorporates the concept of diversification in its premises, and uses the ‘values’ of the business 
units in a very precise way. Details will be given later in this paper. 
  
2.3 Allocation to a service 
The Shapley method has been applied to the problem of allocating service costs in many 
situations.  We mention a small selection and draw some parallels with the context of operational risk. 
Linhart et al (Linhart 1995) allocate the fixed cost of caller IDs (which is the service) in the 
context of companies in a telecommunications system.  They use two methods: Shapley and 
'Incremental Recording'.  For the latter method they allocate points to each company involved in a call, 
and then allocate using the Pro Rata method, based on accumulated points.  They model the service cost 
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by a linear function of the number of identifiable incoming calls.  We will use a similar idea for 
modelling added value when there are a large number of participants.  
Butler and Williams (Butler and Williams 2006) share fixed cost in a general context of 
'facilities' and 'customers', using an Integer Programming technique.  They formalise a concept of 'fair' 
allocation: savings are equalised over all possible consortia, thereby providing a parallel with the 
Shapley method. 
Junqueira et al (Junqueira 2007) use the Aumann-Shapley method (Aumann and Shapley 1974) 
to allocate service costs in the context of networked users in an energy market. 'Fair' allocation implies 
that the charge for a service is proportional to the degree of use of that service, and to efficient location 
of the service.  They consider a network with about 10000 nodes, and simulate the marginal cost of 
transmission by a linearized power flow model.  In many ways this method has a parallel with the 
methods proposed in this paper, in that a small number of parameters apply for all nodes. 
Dehez (Dehez 2011) provides comprehensive accounts of fixed cost allocation and the theory 
behind the Shapley method, and also gives a simple numerical example 
 
2.3.1  Allocation from the Service Provider’s point of View 
In section 4.4 we will introduce a ‘business unit’ that is fundamentally different to other 
business units in that it has no capital charge associated with it in advance of an allocation 
process.  To ensure that this difference is clear, we will not refer to it a ‘business unit’.  Instead, it will 
be called a ‘Service Provider’, or ‘Service’ for short.  The effect of cooperation between the business 
units is that once the total capital charge is allocated, their allocations will be less than their pre-
allocation capital charges.  The relative difference of their charges pre- and post-allocation is known 
as a ‘diversification factor’, and its value will be calculated in the allocation procedure.  Alternatively, 
the ‘diversification factor’ could be referred to as a “Risk/Cost-Reduction” factor (RCR), because the 
Service will act in one of two ways.  Either the Service induces risk, or it mitigates risk.  An example 
of the former is an IT department, which can introduce risk by failing to rectify problems or by 
carrying out maintenance at inappropriate times.   An example of the latter is a Risk department, 
whose job is to find ways to limit risk.  There will be a different interpretation to allocations to these 
two types of service.  For risk inducers, the allocation process will calculate the capital charge that 
risk inducers should pay.   For risk mitigators, the allocation process will calculate the capital charge 
that they save by limiting risk.   
2.3.2  Allocation from the Business Unit Manager's viewpoint 
From the viewpoint of the Manager of a business unit, B1, anything other than a simply-
understood Pro Rata allocation method should be justifiable on the grounds that the capital payable by 
the business unit should be reduced relative to that resulting from a Pro Rata allocation. To convince 
such a Manager that the Shapley method is 'fairer', than the Pro rata method, one can look at the effect 
of a simple coalition with another business unit, B2.  If B1and B2 can cooperate, the value of B1and 
B2 together, v(B1,B2), will be less than the values of B1and B2 separately i.e. v(B1,B2) < v(B1) + 
v(B2).  The allocation for B1is therefore expressed in terms of v(B1)/v(B1,B2), which is less than 
v(B1)/(v(B1) + v(B2)).  Therefore B1is charged less capital.  The complete Shapley method is an 
extension of this idea, and lessens the charge for B1 even more.    
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A by-product of the Shapley allocation process is that less risky business units are rewarded 
for their achievement in risk mitigation.  This should serve to encourage riskier business units to 
manage their risk more effectively. 
 
2.4 Shapley Allocation 
Shapley allocation is, in principal, a 'fair' allocation method because it accounts for the benefits 
of forming coalitions.  This could be translated into working efficiently in a professional environment.  
In the context of operational risk, this is not tangible.  The justification "Shapley allocation is the fairest 
means of allocation because business units are charged only for losses they incur" is more likely to be 
seen as credible.  It intentionally hides the details of how the allocation is done.  Shapley's original 
allocation formula, (Shapley 1953), gives the allocation for a member i, in a coalition C, as 
𝜑𝑖 = ∑
(𝑠 − 1)! (𝑛 − 𝑠)!
𝑛!
[𝑣(𝑠) − 𝑣(𝑠\{𝑖})]
 
𝑖∈𝐶
. 
            (1) 
where v(•) is the 'value' of the coalition, s is a coalition, and n is the number of members in C.  The 
notation has been changed slightly, and will be explained in detail at a later stage.  The important points 
to note here are that each coalition s has a 'value' (as measured by a suitable metric), and the term [v(s) 
- v(s\{i}]/n!, which represents the mean of the marginal values added when member i joins coalition s. 
This term is an important feature of the analysis of this paper. 
Shapley's allocation formula, equation (1), implies an algorithm for calculating Shapley 
values which gives an insight into the method that equation (1) does not.  The algorithm proceeds by 
considering all permutations of players.  For each permutation, the marginal effect of a new player to 
an existing coalition is considered.  The Shapley value is then the mean value of the marginal 
contributions for each player. 
The Shapley method should be contrasted with the Pro Rata method, which, is more obviously 
'fair'.  The essential difference between the two methods is that Pro Rata does not account for the benefits 
of cooperation. 
 
2.4.1 Problems in applying the Shapley Allocation 
The Shapley analysis suffers from a number of drawbacks.  First, if the number of members in 
a coalition C is large ('large' in this context often means '7' or more), combinatorial problems inhibit 
exact computations.  Second, there is a need to find values, v(s), for all coalitions.  How to do this is 
often unclear in many contexts, including operational risk.  Even if such values could be calculated, 
further combinatorial problems would make it hard to proceed with an exact solution.  In addition, the 
mechanics of the method are not explainable to business unit managers, who need to be assured that the 
capital allocation to their business function is 'fair' and representative. 
The impact of Equation (1) is that all permutations of n members should be considered to obtain 
an exact Shapley value.  If it is not feasible to examine all of them, the possibility of sampling exists, 
but only in conjunction with a way to find the value of all coalitions in the sample. Liben-Nowell et al 
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(Liben-Nowell 2012), and Castro et al (Castro 2009) give an account of some sampling strategies, with 
an indication of sample size required.  We have found that approximately 250000 samples are needed 
to give allocations close to the exact outcomes for a total of five UoMs. 
Consequently, we propose an alternative approach, which implements the Shapley algorithm 
implied by equation (1), but avoids the associated pitfalls. 
 
3  Allocation Applied to Operational Risk 
In this section we apply allocation of capital charges using the Shapley algorithm. 
3.1  Shapley allocation: problems for Operation Risk 
In the context of operational risk, a solution must be found for calculating a Shapley value for a 
large number of participants, for which the values of coalitions are not immediately available.  
Furthermore, the final results must be seen as 'fair' in a 'business as usual' sense.  We therefore make 
two assumptions. 
 When a new member joins a coalition, the new member introduces a minimal diversification which 
is a function of the value of the new member.  Effectively, members of a coalition do not care who 
is in it, and may not even know who is in it. 
 An additional 'service' member is added.  This member has initial value zero, and during the course 
of the allocation process, absorbs value from other members. This will ensure that no other member 
receives an increased allocation, and is a key point. 
 
3.2  Notation 
Allocation is often studied as part of game theory, so we use terms from game theory in this 
paper. In particular, the term 'Unit of Measure' will be used synonymously with the term 'player' from 
game theory.  The term 'coalition' has already been used: it means a collection of players who cooperate.  
The 'value', v(P), of a single player P is, for operational risk, the 99.9% value-at-risk derived from fitting 
a frequency and severity distribution to loss data, and sampling annual loss from those distributions. 
Let there be n players, denoted P1, P2,…,Pn.  Although the players are numbered 1to n, they 
may be placed in a particular order.  If they are, they will be denoted by P[1], P[2],…, P[n], where each of 
the subscripts [1], [2],..,[n] takes one value only from the set of integers 1to n. For example, if there are 
four players, and they are placed in the order P3, P2, P4, P1, the order will be denoted by P[1], P[2], P[3], 
P[4], where [1]=3, [2]=2, [3]=4 and [4]=1. 
A coalition, C, formed by any explicit subset of size r (1 ≤ r ≤ n) of these players is denoted by 
listing the players in braces: C = {P[1], P[2],…, P[r]}.  The number of players in C is denoted by |C|. 
The value of an individual player Pr (i.e. a player not in a coalition) will be denoted by vr.  More 
generally, the value of any coalition C will be denoted by v(C).  The value of a player denoted by P[r] 
will be denoted by v[r]. 
The marginal allocation to a player P will be denoted by M(P), sometimes with a subscript when 
appropriate.  This is the difference in values of an existing coalition before and after P joins.   
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A cost function defines how the addition of a new player P to a coalition C affects the value of 
that coalition.  It is usually expressed as v(CU P) = some function of v(C) and v(P). 
The Shapley value of player Pr is denoted by SH(n, r).  At a later stage we will compare the 
Shapley allocation to Pr with the corresponding allocation derived from the Pro Rata method, which 
will be defined when the comparison is made.  The Pro Rata value of player Pr is denoted by PR(n, r).   
 
4  Diversification in a Coalition 
In order to solve the problem of undefined coalition values, we have to make assumptions.  
 All coalitions are possible. 
 The diversification attributed to any coalition is a function of the value of the player entering a 
coalition (except for the support function obviously).  Capital values can vary significantly, so 
it does not make sense to settle on a fixed value that can be deducted from each capital value 
in the course of an allocation process.  If this is done, some allocations can be negative, which 
is highly undesirable.   
 Any constant diversification cannot be guaranteed to be small, although a small diversification 
is a principal motivation for developing this scheme.  The business justification is that, in 
general, business units (“players”) interact to a minimal extent, but if they do there is a minimal 
diversification effect.  In particular, when there are a large number of players, it is assumed that 
the introduction of a new member to an existing coalition is minimal. 
The global diversification benefit is obtained from the largest coalition possible (the 'grand' 
coalition), assuming that the order of the players does not impact the value of the coalition. 
The aim of this analysis is to produce a closed-form expression for the Shapley allocation for any 
of the players in the domain, given the distinction between service and business unit. 
 
4.1  A 3-player Shapley analysis under constant factor diversification 
Some basic examples of a Shapley calculation exist in the literature, although they do not 
always give sufficient details of how to implement the algorithm.  Garcia-Diaz and Lee (Garcia-Diaz 
and Lee 2013) provide some, but not set out in a useful form. Dehez (Dehez 2011) gives a simple 
numerical example with the supporting theory of the Shapley method. Tarashev et al (Tarashev 2009) 
show a similar calculation using operational risk capital values.  They use a tabular form, but do not 
clarify the point that marginals must be allocated to the correct column of the table.  For this reason, we 
present a model Shapley analysis for 3 players (Table 1 below), and clarify how the table is populated.  
This example is geared to a further example in which we introduce a service.  To this end, we define 
the value of coalitions indirectly by stating the marginal value when a new player joins. 
The values of the players, P1, P2 and P3 are v1, v2 and v3 respectively.  When a new player P 
enters a coalition C, we define a cost function v(CU P) = v(C) + v(P) - dv(P) where 0 < d < 1 is a constant 
factor. The table is followed by an example of how the result for the 3rd line is derived.  
Table 1: 3-player example 
Permutation Allocation to P1 Allocation to P2 Allocation to P3 
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P1 P2 P3 v1 v2 - dv2 v3 - dv3 
P1 P3 P2 v1 v2 - dv2 v3 - dv3 
P2 P1 P3 v1 - dv1 v2 v3 - dv3 
P2 P3 P1 v1 - dv1 v2 v3 - dv3 
P3 P1 P2 v1 - dv1 v2 - dv2 v3 
P3 P2 P1 v1 - dv1 v2 - dv2 v3 
Sum 6v1 - 4 dv1 6v2 - 4dv2 6v3 - 4dv3 
Shapley value v1 - 2dv1/3  v2 - 2dv2/3  v3 - 2dv3/3  
         
As an example, the derivation of the 3rd permutation, P2 P1 P3 is by the following steps. 
P2 enters a coalition first.  The marginal allocation to P2 is therefore v2, entered in the “Allocation to P2” 
column.  At this stage the 3rd line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to P1 Allocation to P2 Allocation to P3 
P2    (P1 P3)  v2  
 
P1 is the next player to enter the coalition.  The marginal allocation to P1 is the difference of the 
allocation to the coalition {P2, P1} and the allocation to P2 alone: 
v(P2 P1) - v(P2) = v(P1) - dv(P1)  = v1 – dv1, which is entered in the “Allocation to P1” column.  At this 
stage the 3rd line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to P1 Allocation to P2 Allocation to P3 
P2 P1   (P3) v1 - dv1 v2  
 
P3 is the last player to enter the coalition.  The marginal allocation to P3 is the difference of the allocation 
to the coalition {P2, P1, P3} and the allocation to {P2, P1}.  This is: 
v(P2 P1P3) - v(P2 P1) = v(P3) - dv(P3)  = v3 – dv3,  
which is entered in the “Allocation to P3” column.  Finally, the 3rd line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to P1 Allocation to P2 Allocation to P3 
P2 P1 P3 v1 - dv1 v2 v3 - dv3 
 
The Shapley values are then obtained by calculating the mean of the marginals for each player 
(the last two lines of the table).  The 3-player example indicates a pattern for a general case of n players.    
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4.2  An n-player Shapley analysis under constant factor diversification 
We now consider the general case of n (>1) players.  Any pattern implied by the 3-player 
example can be reinforced by considering the equivalent 4-player case. 
Proposition 1 
For n players P1, P2,…,Pn with values v1, v2,…,vn, define a cost function by 
v(CU P) = v(C) + v(P) - dv(P) where 0 <d< 1 is a constant factor.                 (2) 
Then the Shapley value of player Pr is given by  
SH(n, r) = vr – (1 – 1/n)dvr         (3) 
A proof is given in Appendix A.  The result of this model is that the Shapley allocation of a 
player Pr is simply its value reduced by an amount proportional to its value. The problem of how to 
determine a value for the parameter d remains, and will be addressed later in this paper.  The constant 
factor d is also not entirely realistic as it does not account for any diminishing diversification as new 
entrants join large coalitions. The advantage of obtaining this result is that it applies for any n, however 
large, given the assumption that all players receive the same diversification factor d.  Since the actual 
diversification is dvr, the diversification accounts for the stand-alone value of players.  In general, the 
idea of defining a standard way to treat the added value for all coalitions mirrors the approaches of 
Linhart et al (Linhart 1995), and Junqueira et al (Junqueira 2007).   
 
4.3  Comparison with Pro Rata allocation 
Using the Pro Rata allocation method, the allocation for each player is in proportion to their 
stand-alone values vr.  The total amount to be allocated is the sum of all such stand-alone values.  
Therefore the Pro Rata allocation for Pr is 
  r
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,          (4) 
The difference between the Shapley and Pro Rata allocations is then, from (3) and (4) 
PR(n, r) - SH(n, r) = (1- 1/n)dvr         (5) 
The Pro Rata allocation clearly exceeds the Shapley allocation, which means that the task of 
explaining the allocation to risk managers is easy: their allocation is less than it might have been.  
Furthermore, no one player has been treated more favourably than any another. Note that without the 
diversification benefit, the Shapley and Pro Rata allocations would be equal.  Besides, Pro Rata does 
not apply to departments that do not contribute to income, losses, etc., i.e. if a unit does not generate 
income then it would not be allocated capital.  
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4.4  A model incorporating a service, under constant factor diversification 
The essence of a service, as distinct from a business function, is that it does not generate income 
in its own right, but instead receives income from one or more business functions.  As such, a service 
should act as an absorber of risk capital, thereby reducing the risk capital of contributory business 
functions.  In order to model a mixture of business functions and one or more services, the principal 
task is to ensure that diversification rules allow for transfer of value to the services when coalitions are 
formed.  A secondary problem is to ensure that a service is not treated as a dummy player (one who 
adds zero value to a coalition).  As such it would receive zero allocation in the Shapley process.  This 
is the opposite of what is intended.   An easy way to avoid treating a service as a dummy player in our 
analyses is to make an initial minimal transfer of value to the service from all business functions that 
use the service.  After that, the allocation process can proceed such that the service receives a positive 
allocation. The business functions then receive reduced allocations to compensate. 
We now state a definition of “service” and propose rules that apply when a single service 
interacts with a coalition.   
Definition 1  A Service (alternatively termed Service Player), S, is a player that satisfies: 
1. 0 <v(S) << v(P)for all other players P; 
2. Whenever S enters a coalition C = {P[1], P[2],…, P[k]}, the value of the resulting coalition is given 
by v(C US) = v(C) + v(S) + f(d, P[1], P[2],…, P[k]), where f(•)>0 is some function of a constant 
diversification factor d and the values of the members of C (the important points being that f is 
positive and is added, not subtracted).     
A player that is not a Service will, when convenient, be referred to as a Non-Service or Non-Service 
Player.            
  
Point (1) requires that a service is assigned a minimal value in advance of any allocation. This 
is a technicality of  the Shapley analysis: its purpose is to ensure that the Service is not treated as a 
dummy player. The intuition behind point (2) of this definition is that whenever S enters a coalition, 
marginal value is added for S, who absorbs value from other players in C. Note that in most companies, 
cost transfer mechanisms are used when the support function works for a business function.  This 
amount may be marginal but can be used to justify the minimal value assigned initially. 
In order to use this definition, we define the value of each player in the following way.  If there 
are n players, denoted P1, P2,…,Pn, without loss of generality let P1 be a Service.  The other players are 
non-services, and need not be in any particular order.  We first populate P1 with a nominal value by 
transferring a small amount  from each of the other players.  Picking a very small value  (compared 
to the vr), let the values of the players be: 
v(Pr) = vr - for 2 ≤ r ≤ n. 
v(P1) = (n-1)           (6) 
The intention is that S receives a small value from each of the other players, such that the total transfer 
to S, (n-1), should be much smaller than the values of all the other players. With this initialisation, an 
easy result for the marginal allocation to S when S enters a coalition follows. 
From [Def 1],  
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M(S)  = v(C US) - v(C)  
= v(S) + f (•) 
= (n-1)f (•)           
 
4.4.1  Three-player example, including a service 
In this section we give an example of a Shapley allocation for three players, A, B and a service 
S. Their stand-alone values are, using Equation (6), 
v(A) = va- ;    v(B) = vb- ;    v(S) = 2.  
The diversification defined by [Def1] will be made explicit.  For n players (n = 3 here), let  
f (•) = (n - 1)dm,          (8)  
where m is the median of the values of the non-service players, and d (0<d< 1) is the constant 
diversification factor.  We choose the median rather than the mean because it is less sensitive to extreme 
values. The factor 2 in "v(S)=2" comes from the number of non-service players.  Effectively, an amount 
dm is transferred to the service from each non-service. 
 
When a non-service player P enters a coalition C, the cost function from Equation (2) is 
replaced by (CU P) = v(C) + v(P) - dv(P) - dm.       (9) 
Table 2 shows the Shapley analysis.  The table is followed by a brief explanation of how three 
typical rows are constructed.  
Table 2: Shapley analysis with one service, constant diversification factor 
Permutation Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
S A B 2 va - - dva- dm vb - - dvb- dm 
S B A 2 va - - dva- dm vb - - dvb- dm 
A B S 2 + 2dm va -  vb - - dvb- dm 
A S B 2 + 2dm va -  vb - - dvb- dm 
B A S 2 + 2dm va - - dva- dm vb -  
B S A 2 + 2dm va - - dva- dm vb -  
Sum 12 + 8dm 6va - 6- 4dva- 4dm 6vb - 6- 4dvb- 4dm 
Shapley value 2 + 4dm/3 va - - 2dva/3- 2dm/3 vb - - 2dvb/3- 2dm/3 
    
Row 1 (S A B) is an example of a service being the first in a coalition, and is formulated as follows. 
S enters a coalition first.  The marginal allocation to S is therefore 2, entered in the “Allocation to S” 
column.  At this stage the 1st line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
S    (A B) 2   
 
A is the next player to enter the coalition.  The marginal allocation to A is the difference of the allocation 
to the coalition {S, A} and the allocation to S alone.  By [Definition 1] and (9) this is: 
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va - )– dva- dm,  
which includes a diversification (-dva- dm), and appears in the “Allocation to A” column.  At this stage 
the 1st line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
(SA)B 2 va - - dva- dm  
 
B is the last player to enter the coalition.  The marginal allocation to B is the difference of the allocation 
to the coalition {SAB} and the allocation to {S A}. This is, from [Def 1]: 
(vb - - dvb- dm,  
which includes a diversification (-dvb- dm), and appears in the “Allocation to B” column.  Finally, the 
3rd line in the table is 
Permutation Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
SAB 2 va - - dva- dm vb - - dvb- dm 
 
The treatment of rows in which S does not come first is essentially the same, but contains some 
important differences.  An example is row 6 (B S A). The steps are, with only essential commentary: 
Comment Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
B enters first   vb - dvb- dm 
S enters next: diversification 2dm 2 + 2dm  vb - dvb- dm 
A enters last 2 + 2dm va - dva- dm vb - dvb- dm 
 
Finally, row 5 (B A S) is an example where the service is the last to join a coalition. 
Comment Allocation to S Allocation to A Allocation to B 
B enters first   vb - dvb- dm 
A enters next   va - dva- dm vb - dvb- dm 
S enters last: diversification 2dm 2 + 2dm va - dva- dm vb - dvb- dm 
 
Referring to Table 2, the approximation → 0 gives the Shapley values that correspond to the case 
where the service has no intrinsic value, and receives none from other players prior to allocation.  They 
are 
 S A B 
Shapley value, → 0 4dm/3 va2dva/3 - 2dm/3 vb2dvb/3 - 2dm/3 
 
 
4.4.2  n-player closed-form solution with a service 
The example of three players, one of which is a service, indicates to how to analyse the case 
where there are many more (non-service) players.  The cases where a particular player is the first to 
enter a coalition should be treated separately from other cases.  
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Let there be n players P1, P2,…,Pn, of which P1 is the Service.  Their stand-alone values are 
defined by equation (6), in which a small value has been transferred from each non-service player to 
the Service.  The ‘stand-alone’ values vr (2 ≤ r ≤ n) are determined by an appropriate calculation based 
on the distribution of losses for Pr.  The overall cost function is given by [Definition 1] with the 
additional definition for the diversification in Equations (8, 9).  To compensate for adding value to the 
service, players have their marginal allocations reduced by an amount dm. 
The closed form result for the Shapley allocation for each player is given in the following 
proposition 
Proposition 2: 
The Shapley values for the non-service players Pr (2 ≤ r ≤ n) and the Service P1are given by 
SH(n,r)  = vr - - dvr(1 – 1/n) - dm(1n)  (2 ≤ r ≤ n) 
SH(n,1)  = (n-1)+ (n-1)dm(1n)         
The proof is given in Appendix B. The similarity of this result to equation (3), for which there 
is no service, is readily apparent: there is a swap of allocation between the non-services and the service, 
who gains additional allocation.  The limiting cases where → 0 are obvious.  They correspond to the 
actual situation where the service incurs no operational risk losses.  An example of the use of (10) with 
operational risk loss data will be given in section 5. 
 
4.5  n-player closed-form solution with a service and diminishing diversity 
In this section we extend the idea of the previous closed-form solution to model a diminishing 
diversity effect.  The intuition behind this is that for a large number of players, adding an extra one 
makes very little difference to the value of the augmented coalition.  In the revised model, the added 
value when a new member joins decreases with increasing coalition size.  We have selected a 
geometrically decreasing function of the coalition size, but in principle, any appropriate means to reduce 
diversification should be satisfactory. 
Using the same notation as for Proposition 2, we amend the cost function (9) to account for the 
number of players already in the coalition when a new member joins.  The new cost function for non-
service players is (where m is the median of the values v2,…,vn and 0 <d< 1) 
v(CU P) = v(C) + v(P) - d|C|v(P) - d|C|m.        (11) 
Using (11) and the rules for adding a service to a coalition (7, 8) we state 
 
Proposition 3: 
The Shapley values for the non-service players Pr (2 ≤ r ≤ n) and the Service P1 under conditions 
of diminishing diversification are given by 
SH(n,r) = vr - - (m +vr)Dn/n   (2 ≤ r ≤ n) 
SH(n,1)  = (n-1)+ (n-1)mDnn          
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The proof is given in Appendix C.  An example of the use of (12) with operational risk loss 
data will be given in section 5.  In addition to the limiting case → 0, the approximation Dn ~ d for 
small d is notable.  The interpretation of this approximation when applied to loss data is that 
diversification extends effectively to coalitions of size two, but no further.   
 
5  APPLICATION TO LOSS DATA: CAPITAL VALUE CALCULATION 
In this section we apply the closed-form Shapley formulae to a collection of loss data sets for 
which it would be impossible to calculate exact Shapley values.  The data sets comprise losses for 11 
UoMs, each with losses ranging from very small to millions of euros. Business units do not cooperate 
in practice, so any ‘cooperation’ has to be measured by considering loss data alone. In this context, 
cooperation takes the form of calculating diversification, which should reduce regulatory capital. 
Furthermore, once a UoM is defined in terms of a combination of one or more business units and risk 
classes, the concept of actual cooperation no longer makes sense: business units can cooperate if they 
wish, but risk classes cannot.  Furthermore, 11 UoMs makes an exact Shapley calculation non-viable 
because of the combinatorial problems involved. 
Each data set comprises a list of losses and corresponding dates covering a five year period 
from mid-2009 to mid-2014.  A threshold (minimum loss) of €10 has been set on most of them to 
eliminate very low value losses, which should more properly be regarded as operational expenses rather 
than operational risk losses.  In other cases, if the annual loss frequency is very high, the threshold has 
been set higher in order to reduce the loss frequency further, thereby obtaining a reasonable stand-alone 
capital value.  The maximum loss in all data sets combined is about €8.5m. 
The data sets are labelled P2, P3, …, P12 for convenience.  To them we add a Service, P1, which 
has no measured losses.  The Service is nominally labelled “Risk Department”.  The service it provides 
is to develop and implement risk-mitigation practice.  With this notation, the ‘players’ in previous 
sections are synonymous with the data sets that represent them. 
The stand-alone capital values {vr,} are calculated in a standard way, using the LDA approach 
described by Frachot et al (Frachot, Georges and Roncalli 2001).  Using this method,  the following 
capital values were obtained (Table 3). All capital figures are in €m. The third column shows the capital 
values following transfer of a nominal €0.001m from each business unit to the Service, to prevent the 
Service from being treated as a dummy player (see section 4.4). This amount is enough to make the 
transfer process clear and visible, given the 5 significant figure accuracy used. The amount could be 
smaller, say €1, which would not register in the amended capitals for the other players.   
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Table 3: Capital values 
UoM r Capital vr Capital vr after 
transfer to Service 
1 0 0.011 
2 51.751 51.750 
3 11.918 11.917 
4 9.887 9.886 
5 81.196 81.195 
6 80.585 80.584 
7 2.368 2.367 
8 21.565 21.564 
9 5.498 5.497 
10 7.509 7.508 
11 1.596 1.595 
12 13.164 13.163 
 
 
5.1  Application to loss data: calculation of the diversification factor 
In order to assess the diversification factor, we evaluate the effect of any one UoM on the others.  
A useful way to do this is to first aggregate the losses from all UoMs to give a capital value for the 
Grand Coalition.  Then, each UoM is successively removed, and the capital value, Cr', for the remaining 
UoMs (i.e. the Grand Coalition without the UoM that was removed) is calculated (Table 4).  The method 
is described in detail in Milliman (2009).         
Table 4: Capital values obtained by aggregating all but one UoMs. 
UoM, r Cr' (€m) 
Aggregate 36.497 
2 33.692 
3 28.806 
4 37.208 
5 20.142 
6 36.770 
7 35.338 
8 35.589 
9 66.272 
10 32.265 
11 33.763 
12 35.035 
          
     
The diversification factor is then calculated by finding the median value of the percentage 
deviation of the value of each UoM from the aggregate.  The use of the median ensures that any extreme 
values do not influence the result unduly.  The result was d = 4.17%, which is used as 0.0417. 
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5.2  Calculation of the Shapley allocation using constant factor diversification 
Having determined the constant factor diversification factor, d, calculating the Shapley 
allocations is an easy matter of applying Equation (10).  The results are in Table 5.  The limiting value 
case → 0 makes no difference in practice since is within the limits of stochastic variation of the 
Loss Distribution Approach. 
Table 5: Shapley allocation: constant factor diversification 
UoM, r Shapley allocation, SH(12, r) (€m) 
1 5.026 
2 49.313 
3 11.004 
4 9.051 
5 77.632 
6 77.044 
7 1.820 
8 20.282 
9 4.830 
10 6.764 
11 1.077 
12 12.202 
      
     
Comparing the results in Tables 3 and 5 (before and after allocation respectively), it is clear that 
each (non-service) business unit has had its capital value reduced with respect to the corresponding Pro 
Rata allocations. The service (P1) has gained considerably in relative terms, but not in absolute terms.  
The important question at this stage is "will this allocation be seen as fair by business units?".  To 
answer this we can provide the following indicators. 
 All capital values are reduced.  
 No business unit can argue that any particular business unit is favoured over any other. 
 In order for services to survive, function properly and be of benefit to business functions (by 
reducing losses, costs and expenses), they should be allocated part of the total capital.  
 Less risky business units, which have small capital values, are rewarded by receiving a greater 
percentage reduction than more risky business units, which have larger capital values. 
In practice, the allocation to the Service would not be formally allocated. It would be made available 
for investment elsewhere in the business.   
 
5.3 Calculation of the Shapley allocation using diminishing factor diversification 
The theoretical result for the closed-form Shapley value when the diversification factor reduces 
as the number of players in a coalition increases is given by Equation (12).  This models the idea that 
as a coalition size increases, a new entrant to the coalition provides a progressively smaller contribution 
to the coalition.  If the Shapley values are calculated using Equation (12), we would expect a smaller 
diversification effect.  This is indeed the case, as shown in Table 6. 
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 Table 6: Shapley allocation: diminishing factor diversification 
UoM, r Shapley allocation, SH(12, r)  (€m) 
1 0.4868 
2 51.518 
3 11.829 
4 9.806 
5 80.856 
6 80.247 
7 2.314 
8 21.442 
9 5.433 
10 7.437 
11 1.545 
12 13.071 
         
Table 6 shows that the diversification effect is very small compared to the constant factor 
diversification case (Table 5).  This reflects the effectively zero diversification in this model when a 
coalition size is greater than two.  Figure 3 shows a direct comparison (the difference between the Pro 
Rata and Shapley allocations) of the two calculations.  
Figure 3: Comparison of constant and diminishing diversification factor 
 
    
Two further points are noteworthy.   
First, it is possible that some of the Shapley allocations calculated by either of the methods 
shown in Figure 3 can be negative. Table 5 shows that the allocations to UoMs 7 and 11 are near zero 
compared to other entries in that table.  Further calculations show that if the diversification factor, d, is 
increased to about 9%, negative allocations do result. This is undesirable, both from a theoretical and 
from a 'political' point of view.  A business unit would not like to see that another business unit was 
receiving allocation funding, rather than paying it. In practice the allocation would be set at an 
appropriate level, perhaps €1.0m or €0.5m for the values in Table 5. 
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The second point is that is that dominant new entrants to a coalition are not modelled in this 
analysis, where 'dominant' indicates that a new entrant has a more significant effect on a coalition than 
other players.  The assumption throughout this analysis is that all players are equivalent in the way they 
add value to a coalition.  They are clearly not equal in terms of their stand-alone values.  The topic of 
dominance is one for further study. 
 
5.4  Sensitivity of the Shapley allocation to the diversification factor 
In this section we investigate the sensitivity of the calculated Shapley values to the diversification 
factor.  If the mean is used to calculate the diversification factor instead of the median, a value d ~ 9.1% 
emerges.  Hence we consider a range of diversification factors from 1 to 10, and recalculate the Shapley 
values using (10) for the constant diversification case and (12) for the diminishing diversification case.  
The results in Figures 4 and 5 respectively show deviations of the Shapley allocations from the 
corresponding Pro Rata allocations, expressed as percentages.  The labels on the "UoM" axis correspond 
to the 11 UoMs P2, ..., P12.  The service P1 is not shown.  The main points of the charts are: 
 The profiles look very similar, the main difference being that the Shapley values are much 
higher for the constant diversification case. 
 Slicing parallel to the UoM axis results in similar profiles for all diversification factors 
 As the diversification factor increases, the Shapley values in the constant diversification case 
increase linearly, and the Shapley values in the diminishing diversification case increase almost 
linearly.  In the latter case, the slight non-linearity due the rapid reduction of the factor dr for r 
> 2 is not apparent in Figure 4. 
 No ill-conditioning is apparent.  
Figure 4: Sensitivity of Shapley allocations to constant diversification factor 
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Figure 5: Sensitivity of Shapley allocations to diminishing diversification factor 
 
   
It should be stressed that the method of calculating the diversification factor (section 5.1) is one 
of many.  We are keen to explore whether or not it can be done (quickly and easily!) by considering a 
correlation structure.  
 
 
6  Conclusion 
We have proposed an allocation methodology that is applicable to a large number of operational 
risk UoMs, including a service in the form of a support function.   Using the Shapley method, we can 
account for diversification by considering coalitions.  For the intended number of UoMs (8-100), it is 
not feasible to do exact calculations for two reasons.  First, the combinatorial complexity prevents it.  
Second, there is no standard way to calculate the value of a coalition.  We therefore assume initially 
that all UoMs contribute to a coalition in the same way, so that they each add a value proportional to 
their stand-alone value when they enter a coalition.  Refining this assumption, so that the added value 
on joining a coalition decreases as the size of the coalition increases, models the case where any new 
entrant to a large coalition adds minimal value. The effect of the service is to absorb allocation from all 
other UoMs. 
There are three principal results of this analysis. 
1. The allocations of all UoMs decrease relative to their Pro Rata allocations, which makes the 
result acceptable to risk managers.  
2. We have derived closed-form expressions for Shapley allocations, which can be used for a large 
number of UoMs, and take negligible computation time. 
3. We have modelled a service as an entity that moderates the capital of UoMs by absorbing 
capital from them. 
 
Examination of the dependency structure of the UoMs using correlations and copulas reveals that 
there is no straightforward relationship between the diversification factor obtained by any one method 
and any other.  The results for the dependency structure analyses produce a result which are of similar 
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orders, but differ in detail.  In principle, we would like to use our allocation method as an alternative 
to formulating a formal dependency structure by considering correlations or a copula.  In this context, 
its use would be to reduce overall regulatory capital by the amount of the diversification factor. This 
procedure now seems a reasonable way forward.  
 
We have also assumed that no dominance exists. The concept of dominance is worthy of a much 
larger study, particularly if we measure dominance as a function of capital value. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Proposition 1 
For n players P1, P2,…,Pn with values v1, v2,…,vn, define a cost function by 
v(CU P) = v(C) + v(P) -dv(P) where 0 <d< 1 is a constant factor.     
Then the Shapley value of player Pr is given by  
SH(n, r) = vr – (1 – 1/n)dvr 
Proof 
If there are n players, there are n! permutations of players.  Consider permutation j.  Let [r] be the 
position of Pr in permutation j.  There are two cases to consider: r = 1 and 2 ≤ r ≤ n 
When Pr is the first to enter a coalition, the marginal allocation for Pr is vr, and there are (n-1)! such 
cases. Therefore there is a contribution to the sum of marginals for Pr: 
M(Pr) = vr(n-1)!          (A1) 
When Pr is not the first to enter a coalition, let [k] be the position of Pr in permutation.  The marginal 
allocation for Pr is the difference between the values of the coalitions C = {P[1], P[2],…, P[k-1}} and {P[1], 
P[2],…, P[k]}.  Using the cost function of the proposition this is 
M(1)(Pr) = v(CUP[k]) -v(C)  
 =v(P[k]) -dv(P[k]) 
 = vr - dvr 
The above difference applies for [n! - (n-1)!] cases.  Therefore there is a further contribution to the sum 
of marginals for Pr: 
M(2)(Pr) = (vr– dvr)×[n! - (n-1)!]        (A2) 
The Shapley value for Pr is therefore given by the mean of (A1) + (A2). 
n!SH(n, r) = M(1)(Pr) + M(2)(Pr)  
 = vr(n-1)! + (vr– dvr)×[n! - (n-1)!] 
Therefore 
SH(n, r) = vr - (1- 1/n)dvr        (A3) 
(which is Equation (3) in the main text) 
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Appendix B 
Proof of Proposition 2 
The Shapley values for the non-service players Pr (2 ≤ r ≤ n) and the Service P1 are given by 
SH(n,r)  = vr - - dvr(1 – 1/n) - dm(1n)  (2 ≤ r ≤ n) 
SH(n,1)  = (n-1)+ (n-1)dm(1n)  
The proof proceeds by enumerating cases for the n! permutations of the players.  In each permutation, 
players enter a coalition in order, and we consider the case where P1enters separately from the others.  
Another distinction is whether or not a player (service or not) is the first to enter the coalition.   
For n-1non-service players P2,…,Pn with values v2-…,vn- define a cost function by 
v(CUPr) = v(C) + v(Pr) -dvr- dm= v(C) + vr- - dvr - dm where 0 <d< 1 is a constant factor and m is the 
median of v2…,vn.          
The Service player P1 has value (n-1), and define its cost function by 
(CU P1) = v(C) + (n-1) + (n-1)dm                a 
Case 1:  P1 is first in the permutation: allocation is to the service P1 
P1 is first (n-1)! times out of n!, and the marginal allocation to P1 each time is (n-1).  The total 
marginal allocation for this case is  
M(1)(P1) = (n-1)!×(n-1)        
Case 2:  P1 is not first in the permutation: allocation is to the service P1 
P1 is not first [n! - (n-1)!] times.   When P1 joins the coalition, P1 receives a marginal allocation 
(n-1)(n-1)dmTherefore the total marginal allocation for this case is  
M(2)(P1) = [n! - (n-1)!]×[(n-1)(n-1)dm      
Case 3:  Pr (a non-service) is first in the permutation: allocation is to Pr 
Pr is first in (n-1)! cases, each with marginal allocation vr - .  There is no diversification.  The 
total marginal allocation for this case is  
M(3)(Pr) = (n-1)!×(vr - )        
Case 4:  Pr is not first in the permutation: allocation is to Pr 
Pr is not first in [n! - (n-1)!] cases.  Suppose that Pr enters the coalition at the k-th place, so 
that r = [k]. Then the marginal allocation to Pr is the difference between the values of the 
coalitions C = {P[1], P[2],…, P[k-1}} and {P[1], P[2],…, P[k]}.  Using (B1) this is 
 M(3)(Pr) = v(CU P[k]) - v(C)  
  = v(P[k]) - dvr - dm= vr -  - dvr- dm 
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The total marginal allocation for this case is then 
M(4)(Pr) = [n! - (n-1)!]×(vrdvr- dm)      (B5) 
By symmetry, all non-service players can be analysed in the same way and have the results that follow 
the same pattern. 
The total marginal allocation for P1, M(P1) is the sum of the marginal in (B2) and (B3). 
M(P1)  = M(1)(P1)  + M(2)(P1)  
= (n-1)!×(n-1) + [n! - (n-1)!]×[(n-1)ndm
n!×(n-1)dnm[n! - (n-1)!]       
The total marginal allocation for Pr, M(Pr) is the sum of the marginal in (B4) and (B5). 
M(Pr)  = M(3)(Pr) + M(4)(Pr) 
 = (n-1)!×(vr - ) [n! - (n-1)!]×(vrdvr-dm) 
 = n!×(vrdvrdm) + d(vr + m)(n-1)!      (B7) 
      
The final stage in the proof is to calculate the mean marginal allocation by dividing (B6) and (B7) by 
the total number of permutations, n! 
SH(n,1)  (n-1) (n-1)dm(1n)       
SH(n,r)  = vrdvr(1n)dm(1n)  (2 ≤ r ≤ n)    
This completes the proof of Proposition2, and Equation (B8) corresponds to (10). 

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Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 3 
For n-1non-service players P2,…,Pn with values v2-…,vn-, define a cost function for when a new 
non-service player Pr joins a coalition C as 
(CUPr) = v(C) + v(Pr) - d
|C|vr - d
|C|m.       (C1) 
where m is the median of the values v2,…,vn and d is a diversification factor in (0, 1). 
The Service player P1 has value (n-1), and define its cost function by   
(CU P1) = v(C) + (n-1) + (n-1)d
|C|m       (C1a) 
We therefore state 
Proposition 3: 
The Shapley values for the non-service players Pr (2 ≤ r ≤ n) and the Service P1 under conditions of 
diminishing diversification given in (C1 and C1a) are given by 
SH(n,r) = vr - - (m + vr)Dn/n   (2 ≤ r ≤ n) 
SH(n,1)  = (n-1)+ (n-1)mDnn 
where Dn = dd2 + ... +d
n-1.    
Proof: 
The proof is similar to that of Appendix B, but the enumerations are different.  There are the same four 
cases. 
Case 1:  P1 is first in the permutation: allocation is to the service P1 
P1 is first (n-1)! times out of n!, and the marginal allocation to P1 each time is (n-1)(from 
Equation 7).  The total marginal allocation for this case is  
M(1)(P1) = (n-1)!×(n-1)       C 
Case 2:  P1 is not first in the permutation: allocation is to the service P1 
P1 is not first [n! - (n-1)!] times.   When P1 joins the coalition, P1 receives a marginal allocation 
(n-1)Additionally there are (n-1)! diversification cases of each of the following, to be 
added: 
 (n-1)md,   (n-1)md2,   ...,   (n-1)mdn-1.  
Therefore the total marginal allocation for this case is  
M(2)(P1) = [n! - (n-1)!]×(n-1)(n-1)! (n-1)mdd2 + ... +d
n-1
 [n! - (n-1)!]×(n-1)(n-1)! (n-1)mDn    C 
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 Case 3:  Pr (a non-service) is first in the permutation: allocation is to Pr 
Pr is first in (n-1)! cases, each with marginal allocation vr - .  There is no diversification.  The 
total marginal allocation for this case is  
M(3)(Pr) = (n-1)!×(vr - )       C 
Case 4:  Pr is not first in the permutation: allocation is to Pr 
Pr is not first in [n! - (n-1)!] cases.  When Pr joins the coalition, Pr receives a marginal allocation 
(vr - in all of those casesAdditionally there are (n-1)! diversification cases of each of the 
following, to be subtracted: 
 vrd,   vrd2,   ...,   vrd
n-1, 
 md,   md2,   ...,   mdn-1.  
 The total marginal allocation for this case is then 
 M(4)(Pr) = [n! - (n-1)!]×(vr)(n-1)!(vr + mdd2 + ... +d
n-1
  [n! - (n-1)!]×(vr)(n-1)!(vr + mDn   (C5) 
By symmetry, all non-service players can be analysed in the same way and have the results that follow 
the same pattern. 
The total marginal allocation for P1, M(P1) is the sum of the marginal in (C2) and (C3). 
M(P1)  = M(1)(P1)  + M(2)(P1)  
= (n-1)!×(n-1) +[n! - (n-1)!]×(n-1)(n-1)! (n-1)mDn 
n!×(n-1) (n-1)m(n-1)!Dn       C6 
The total marginal allocation for Pr, M(Pr) is the sum of the marginal in (C4) and (C5). 
M(Pr)  = M(3)(Pr) + M(4)(Pr) 
 = (n-1)!×(vr - )[n! - (n-1)!]×(vr)(n-1)!(vr + mDn
 = n!×(vr(vr -+m)Dn(n-1)!                (C7)
       
The final stage in the proof is to calculate the mean marginal allocation by dividing (C6) and (C7) by 
the total number of permutations, n! 
SH(n,1)  (n-1) (n-1)mDnn       
SH(n,r)  = vr(vrm)Dnn   (2 ≤ r ≤ n)     C8
This completes the proof of Proposition 3, and Equation (C8) corresponds to (12).  
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